Fifteen tricks to get a concordat through

If concordats are really about “the welfare of mankind” and building “a more fraternal, peaceful and just society” it's a bit puzzling that the Vatican has resorted to  pressure tactics and even legal tricks to get many of them ratified by democratic legislatures. Here are some tested tips on how to get a concordat through.
 

1. Call it something else: convention, treaty, endorsement, agreement, whatever. This is the easiest way to get a concordat through. Amazingly, this simple manoeuvre has worked reliably for more than 200 years. (See "Why aren't they all called 'concordats'?")

● The first tap-dance around the word “concordat” took place in France when Napoleon called his 1801 concordat a “convention” (convention) to try to avoid the suspicion that he'd betrayed the Revolution. This tactful term was again used by a restored Bourbon monarch for two further concordats in 1828. Revisions of these (in 1974, 1999 and 2005) were called “endorsements” (avenants). And the 2008 concordat on higher education is called an “agreement” (accord).

● In Prussia the Lutherans objected to the 1929 concordat negotiated with the papal nuncio Pacelli (the future Pius XII), whereupon he suggested calling the Concordat a “solemn convention.' Everybody was pleased. [1] Today it is officially titled a “treaty” (Vertrag).

● In Brazil, with its secular tradition, a euphemism also proved useful, and the 2009 concordat is officially known as an “agreement” (acordo).

2. Make it with a dictator. Then the dictator's signature (or that of one of his generals) is all you need to get the concordat through. You've no worry that a democratic legislature might block the agreement. As a Superior General of the Jesuits put it, “The Apostolic See, to avoid the risk of open mockery, usually enters into solemn undertakings only where a civil government is under no obligation to seek the consent of a representative body....” [2]

● In Peru the Vatican got the military junta to ratify the concordat on 26 July 1980, just two days before the new democratic constitution came into effect, which would have required that any international treaty be approved by Congress.

● In Austria the Vatican began concordat negotiations with an authoritarian, but duly elected politician and concluded them after he'd become a dictator. By then Dollfuss had banned any parties whose members were likely to question the concordat. That left him with fewer ratifying votes than  were required by the constitution, but that didn't stop the Austrian concordat any more than it stopped the Polish one (see № 6 below).

● Concordats have been signed by many other dictators who had no need to seek ratification by a democratically-elected legislature. These include Mussolini in Italy (1929), Hitler in Germany (1933), Salazar in Portugal (1940), Franco in Spain (1953), the Duvaliers in Haiti (1966 and 1984), Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (1954), Dollfuss in Austria (1933), Aramburu and Onganía in Argentina (1957 and 1966), Bermúdez in Peru (1980), Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire (1992) and Tudjman in Croatia (1996).

 

 

3. Seek compliant politicians, if no dictator is available. The top Jesuit continues his advice about getting a concordat through: if faced with the inconvenient prospect of a legislature, he recommends confining the attempt to where “there can be no reasonable doubt that such consent will be granted.” This means courting politicians. Don't forget to cash in on debts of gratitude. One remarkably favourable legal and financial deal for the Vatican was said to involve “quiet calls between influential folk in the high ends of the establishment, that the Church was calling home favours from old friends in high places”. [3] Other politicians will help push through the concordat, because for one reason or another they are more beholden to the Vatican than to their electorate. Presidents nearing the end of their career are especially promising, since the Vatican can offer them post-political perks, including guest lectureships at Church universities and diplomatic postings to the Church and even support if they run for office in international bodies. 

●  To get important laws through before he stepped down, Brazil's President Luiz (“Lula”) da Silva needed the support of Vatican-friendly politicians, and a secretly-signed concordat appears to have been the price.

●  Poland's Hanna Suchocka was not expecting to be re-elected as Prime Minister, however, after she helped get the concordat signed, she embarked on a Vatican career as Poland's ambassador to both the Sovereign Order of Malta and the Holy See.

4. Make no concordats in the middle of a war. Wait, and then negotiate with the victor. There is a danger in too frequent alterations, since the more the concordat is amended, the more symbolic power is lost. It should remain unthinkable that concordats could be changed or scrapped at will.

● During the Second World War the only major concordat was made with Portugal, which kept out of the conflict.

● And, although Spain's dictator, Franco, was firmly allied with the Church, during the war the Vatican was only willing to give him a less official "convention" ("convenio"), waiting until 1953 (when it was finally clear that his regime would survive in democratic post-war Europe), to let him have his concordat. 
 

5. Use negotiating tactics like timing, “the nibble” and “good guy, bad guy”. You must know what to ask for, but be careful about when you ask for it. There are times to press ahead and times to wait. You will also want to keep back certain items on your want list until the very last minute when the other party is vulnerable. And it can even be useful to let a hardline negotiator precede you, so that you can appear kind and reasonable and harness the gratitude for this in order to finally get the concordat moving.

● The Czech Republic rejected an already-signed concordat in 2003. This time the Vatican is proceeding carefully and is not pressing for compensation to the Church for lands nationalised by the former Communist government ― until the “economic recovery”. Timing is everything. [4]
 
● In Austria the insecure Dollfuss, was ripe for the “nibble”, the technique of making last-minute demands for further “slight changes”. He feared both assassination and a German invasion and wanted the protection of the Vatican. (He even had the Pope bless a crucifix which he dropped out of a plane onto the family farm to protect his relatives.)  Dollfuss was anxious to sign the concordat quickly before Cardinal Pacelli (the future Pius XII) could make any more last-minute demands.

● The Czech archbishop who before an election publically questioned the President's fitness for office was replaced in April 2010 by a new and very friendly archbishop who gives him Christmas presents. The Vatican appears to be playing “Good archbishop, bad archbishop”.

6. Keep the text secret until it's signed. This presents the legislators with a fait accompli: with a document already signed by their head of state and one which can no longer be amended. That's because signing expresses consent to the text of treaty, even though it doesn't mean willingness to be bound by it. [5] After signing, the concordat can only be accepted or rejected as a whole and for members of the ruling party to reject the concordat signed by their own leader is politically hardly an option. [6]

● In Poland no one except the Government negotiators, who were all Catholics, could see the concordat draft until it was signed in 1993. It was held secret even from the MPs who, once it was signed, were only able to vote on accepting or rejecting it as a whole. By that point amendments were no longer possible.

● Georgia was another country where a Vatican concordat faced particular difficulties, and here, too, the text was only revealed in 2003 when it was about to be signed. In the end, even this precaution was not enough. (A couple of years later, to the discomfiture of Georgia, the Vatican bestowed “humanitarian aid” on the breakaway Georgian province of Abkhazia. (See № 11 below.)

● However, in the German states of Brandenburg (2003) and Hamburg (2005) keeping the texts secret until signing worked like a charm: the Germans fell right into line and accepted what “the authorities” had approved. 

●  And, best of all, is when you can not only keep the concordat text secret until it's signed, but even shield the head of state from his country's press by having him to stop by the Vatican and quietly ushering him into the “Treaty Room”. This how it was done with the Portuguese dictator, Salazar, in 1940 and the Brazilian President, da Silva, in 2008. (See How to sign a concordat under the table)

7. Get the concordat ratified by any means possible, legal or not. Once the concordat is signed, try to schedule it to be ratified within a few days, if possible. This prevents a proper parliamentary debate, cuts off public discussion and leaves no time for outside legal experts to examine a complicated document written in opaque language.

● This was how it was planned for the 2003 German concordat in Brandenburg (until a mole revealed the text). [7] And the Slovak Concordat of 2000 was ratified only sixteen working days after it was tabled.

If, despite your best attempts at “discretion” the concordat has attracted too much public attention, try to cut off the debate and rush it though by changing the ratification procedure.

● To get the Brazilian concordat ratified a new law was brought in to change the requirement that a treaty no longer require the approval of Congress, but could be approved by a government committee. 

And, finally, if you can't get the concordat ratified too soon for any opposition to have time to form, and you can't get the ratification rules changed, simply ignore them, even if this means violating the constitution.

● The Polish concordat was passed by a simple majority, even though the Constitution required a two-thirds majority. 
 

8. Sit tight and apply constant pressure, if you can't get it ratified right away. An upcoming election may make the government seek Church support, or perhaps a more Vatican-friendly government will come into power. Time is on your side. Concordats work like a ratchet: any progress will be preserved and any setbacks won't.

● The year before the Slovak presidential and parliamentary elections (February and September 1998), the Vatican sent its foreign minister to negotiate the first concordat. 

● Even in Poland where it took five years, a change in government and two papal trips, in 1998 their concordat was finally ratified. 

● The Czech President, who said he'd never sign the concordat, is now being courted by the new Archbishop who goes hiking with him and gives him Christmas presents.

9. Change the country's constitution to make sure it lacks human rights provisions tough enough to conflict with a concordat. (Even if you only have time to get your concordat signed, but not ratified, this can do the trick.) Then you have a legal fait accompli, where the constitution or other basic laws must accommodate themselves to the concordat, rather than vice versa. This way the Vatican gets to determine the country's most basic legal structure.

● A 19th-century dictator of Colombia, Rafael Núñez, brought in a constitution which proclaimed that “the Apostolic Roman Catholic Church is that of the Nation”. Not much conflict between that and the concordat that he signed in 1887, the very next year.

● Similarly, Italy's postwar Constitution of 1947 had to accommodate itself to the 1929 Concordat made with the dictator Mussolini.

● Key parts of the 1933 concordat made with dictator Englebert Dollfuss were  incorporated into the 1934 Austrian Austrofascist Constitution.

● The year after the death of the Spanish dictator Franco in 1975, his concordat was quickly modified to prevent it being scrapped altogether. Next came the 1978 Constitution, too soon to allow for concordat negotiations. However, the four replacement concordats were ratified by the end of 1979. This put them ahead of the Religious Freedom Law of 1980, which gave the general principles of the Constitution a precise legal interpretation. Thus, the 1980 Religious Freedom Law only applies to the other denominations: Catholic affairs are regulated by the 1979 Concordats. [8]

● And in Poland the concordat was first signed, then used as a basis for the new constitution which was designed to ensure the concordat's ratification. The old constitution which had endorsed separation of church and state was replaced with one that talked vaguely of “the mutual independence of each in its own sphere”, the Church, of course, being allowed to help determine what its proper sphere should be. Even Church sources admitted privately (with great delicacy) “that the concordat arrangements anticipate the Constitution, to some extent are its preparation”. [9]

● In Slovakia, on the other hand, the Constitution, which was already in place, was quickly amended to give the draft “conscience concordat” precedence over national legislation. The Slovak Precedence Clause removes the concordat from parliamentary control. 

 10. Use the softly-softly approach of the “framework concordat”. This treaty is like a Russian doll: it promises further treaties, with the details to be negotiated later. This gradual approach helps you surmount political opposition.

● This strategy proved invaluable in Slovakia, where the brief “Basic Treaty” of 2000 set out the principles in abstract terms and it was only when the follow-up “Conscience concordat” spelled out their detailed implementation, that most Slovaks realised how this could curtail their freedom. But no matter: in principle they have agreed to this and in 2007 the Pope arranged to get part of the “conscience concordat” enacted as Slovak law, while still pressing for it to be revived, despite the objections of European Union human rights experts.

● A framework concordat also proved useful in Israel. In 2007 when the Israeli Government was reluctant to undertake the follow-up concordats mentioned in the framework one, a high Vatican official publically accused it of breaking its “promises”.
 

11. Lay the groundwork even before the breakup of a country. Especially recommended is tacitly encouraging the separatist ambitions of a Catholic enclave. Once this has hived off from a less amenable country, it's much easier to get a concordat.

● In 1990, to the consternation of the Czechoslovak Government, John Paul II visited the Slovak part of the federation, where he kissed the ground, as if he was entering a different country. And the Slovak bishops, in “coded” pronouncements to the faithful, accentuated the abstract right to self-determination and made no call for the referendum which would probably have prevented the breakup. [10]

● In 2006, to the indignation of the Georgian government, the Vatican hinted at recognition of Abkhazia. In a case like this it's a good idea to switch from your political to your religious hat and claim that your dealings have nothing to do with politics, but merely concern “humanitarian aid”. (See Vatican ambassador summoned to Georgian Foreign Ministry after a visit to Abkhazia.)
 

 12. Offer to share the cake. Give them a sliver so that you can keep the rest of the cake for yourself. Citing the ecumenicism of Vatican II, encourage their “church-state agreements”. These lack the clout of an international treaty, but they serve to make the other “recognised” religions feel important and give you backing for your own concordat.

●  As a Catholic theologian wrote in 2000, “the Catholic Church has opened the way for all religious communities to enjoy the same rights”. [11] Objections by other religions have been met by the advice to negotiate their own “concordats”. In Germany as early as 1925 the Bavarian concordat was accompanied by church-state agreements with both the Lutherans and the Calvinists. [12] This share-the-spoils strategy also works for church tax: in Italy an intesa. (The Italian concordat-intesa system still leaves you with 90% of the cake. Bonus gustatus!)

●  And for the first time the concordat signed with Brazil in 2008 explicitly includes the right of other religions to conduct religion classes in state schools (Article 11).

13. Use promises and threats. Naturally, we won't mention the “understandings” with members of Opus dei and other conservative Catholic politicians. But even in public, if you phrase it right, you can effectively to nudge the negotiations along.  

●  Papal trips can be helpful for applying political pressure directly, like the visit to Portugal in May 2010 “to support last-ditch efforts to derail the gay marriage law”. [13] The incentive for a politician to issue the invitation can be political, too, even for a non-Catholic. For example, it's been claimed that the British prime Minister invited the Pope “to shore up Labour’s vote among the faithful in Scotland and hurt the Scottish National Party”. [14] As an added benefit for the Vatican, the whole thing is paid for by the hosts. (See The hallelujah weekend of Ireland and the Slovakian Papal photo-op for the next concordat.

●  Fulminating bishops, especially in conjunction with demonstrations, can also be used to deliver a warning to the government or even to try to cause its fall. (See Catholic Church steps up campaign to oust Spanish government, 2005, and Spanish government protests to Vatican over bishops' election comments, 2008.) 

●  Former Communist-block countries eagerly accept Vatican offers of help in getting into the European Community, with its job opportunities and prized euro. The price, of course, is a concordat. (The latest example is Belarus. The Vatican wants a concordat with this overwhelmingly Orthodox country, in return for a promise to help it with what Cardinal Bertone calls “Belarus's role and place in the international community”. As a Belarusian commentator put it hopefully: “The cardinal could be a sort of intermediary between Europe and Belarus. And an influential intermediary at that.” Some may suspect that to get this Stalinist relic accepted by the EU, the Vatican would need to work a miracle — but then that's its specialty.) 
 

14. Don't forget the mousetrap clause at the end of the concordat. Only a few very secular countries will reject this and demand that there be an “escape clause” allowing one of the parties to cancel it, as in the 1989 Brazilian military concordat, the 2003 Czech concordat and the 2008 French higher education concordat. Most countries will prove more amenable and let you snap the concordat shut. Of course, you will smoothly phrase it in terms of “mutual agreement”, but its real meaning is that any change (let alone cancellation) must have Vatican consent. This effectively removes the concordat from parliamentary control and gives the Vatican veto power over any alterations — forever.   

● In 2006 Hungary was naive enough to hope that there might be a chance to re-negotiate the huge payments to the Church due under their finance concordat. Carefully observing all protocol, the Hungarian Foreign Minister flew to Rome, but found that no one in the Vatican would even talk to him about it. The mousetrap had already snapped shut.

15. Disarm the opposition. For the next wave of concordats it's essential to court the Orthodox patriarchs who could block the spread of concordats throughout their territory. In Georgia in 2003 the Vatican learned a hard lesson when it tried to conclude a concordat in spite of Orthodox opposition. When Archbishop Tauran flew in to Tbilisi he was met by demonstrations at the airport and more demonstrations outside the papal nunciature. The unrest and complaints from the Orthodox patriarch made the government abruptly cancel the signing ceremony the next day and on the following day the Vatican Secretary for Relations with States went home again with an unsigned concordat. [15]  

The Vatican is not eager to repeat this humiliation. Hardly a month goes by without some Vatican overtures to one of the patriarchs of the Orthodox lands: prayers for them, birthday greetings, publication of their writing, visits to the Vatican and constant talk of Christian unity. If they can be won over, the way is free for a second wave of concordats. The first one was touched off by the dissolution of the USSR which enabled the Vatican to get concordats with the traditionally Catholic countries of the former East Block. However, east of them lie the Orthodox lands. For a second wave to come about, the patriarchs must be won over. Then concordats can be extended throughout the Balkans — the Caucasus — the states of Central Asia — and all the way through Russia.
 

 

Notes

1. Religion: Peace & the Papacy, Time, 16 August 1943. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,933208-3,00.html

2. Francis Xavier Wernz, SJ, Jus Decretalium I, 166, (Rome, 1905). He was a famed canonist at the Gregorian University in Rome who later (1907-1914) became superior general of the Jesuits and a trusted adviser to Pope Pius X. http://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=3230 

3. Sam Smyth, "State lost high-stakes game with two nuns", Independent.ie, 22 May 2009. http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/state-lost-highstakes-game-with-two-nuns-1747597.html

4. "Church does not insist on settlement due to recession - Czech PM", ČTK, Čseké Noviny, 26 September 2009. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/news/zpravy/church-does-not-insist-on-settlement-due-to-recession-czech-pm/399726

5. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Signature", Glossary of Treaty Terms. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/publications-and-documents/treaties/practice-procedures/glossary-treaty-terms

6. "Konkordat in Brandenburg", IBKA Rundbrief, December 2003. http://www.ibka.org/artikel/rundbriefe03/brandenburg.html

7. Gerd Wartenberg, “Offener Brief an die Mitglieder des Landtags und der Landesregierung Brandenburgs”, 30 October 2003. http://www.ibka.org/artikel/ag03/hvbbkon.html

8. Jaime Rossell, “State-Religion relations in Spain and Portugal: a brief outline”, 1999, p. 5. http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/56/documents/Rossell_Istanbul1999.pdf. The author is a law professor at the University of Extramadura.

9. “Co w nowym konkordacie jest szczególnie ważne?” (“What in the new concordat is particularly important?”), Father Adam Boniecki interviewed by Tygodnik Powszechny
Onet.pl wiadomósci, 19 March 2006.
http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/jp2/5169,1704,1319956,text.html

10. Frans Hoppenbrouwers, “Nationalistic Tendencies In The Slovak Roman Catholic Church”. Religion in Eastern Europe, Volume XVIII, Number 6, December 1998, pp. 7-8. The author is a Roman Catholic Church historian and secretary of studies of the Dutch Roman Catholic relief organization, Communicantes. http://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-swk/ree/Hoppenbrouwers_Nationalistic_Dec%201998.pdf

11. Roland Minnerath, (Professor of Catholic Theology, Marc Bloch University, Strasbourg), “The Experience of the Catholic Church in Structuring its Relationship with States in the XX Century”,  Исторический Вестник (Istoricheskii Vestnik, Herald of History), no.
9-10 (2000). http://www.vob.ru/public/bishop/istor_vest/2000/5-6_9-10/1_16.htm

12. Gesetz zu dem Konkordate mit dem Heiligen Stuhle und den Verträgen mit den Evangelischen Kirchen vom l5. Januar 1925, (GVBl. S. 53). http://www.verfassungen.de/de/by/bayern-kirchenvertraege25.htm

13. John L Allen Jr, “Benedict in Portugal: A different crisis, secularism, and 'Marian Cool'”, NCR, 7 May 2010. http://ncronline.org/blogs/all-things-catholic/benedict-portugal-different-crisis-secularism-and-marian-cool

14. Martin Beckford, “David Cameron puts more money and resources into Pope's visit”, Telegraph, 3 July 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/religion/the-pope/7868680/David-Cameron-puts-more-money-and-resources-into-Popes-visit.html

15. Felix Corley, "Georgia: Catholics fail to break Orthodox monopoly", Forum 18 News Service, 25 September 2003. http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=144

 

(Last updated 14 June 2010)